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COMMENTS
GENDER SPECIFIC REGULATIONS IN THE
CHEMICAL WORKPLACE
I. INTRODUCTION
Women are entering the workforce in increasing proportions,
particularly in traditionally male-dominated job categories. There
are an estimated 36,000,000 female workers in the United States,
approximately 65% of childbearing age.' Some of the jobs selected by
women involve potential exposure to health or safety risks, including
the possibility of reproductive injury (e.g., exposure to lead, radia-
tion, anesthetic gas, or potentially dangerous chemicals).2 Many
employers have chosen to restrict women of childbearing capacity
from working with reproductive hazards while not restricting men
who may also be exposed to such hazards.' Employers argue that
they must choose between either risking a sex discrimination lawsuit
by adopting "gender specific" regulations or risking tort damages
0 1987 by Sherri Evans-Stanton. The author wishes to thank Kent Stormer for his inspi-
ration and guidance.
1. Hricko, Social Policy Considerations of Occupational Health Standards: The Exam-
ple of Lead and Reproductive Effects, 7 PREVENTIVE MED. 394, 400 (1978). "Childbearing
age" or "childbearing capacity" refers to the range of ages during which women are biologi-
cally capable of becoming pregnant regardless of whether they use birth control. See infra text
accompanying notes 48-49. For purposes of this discussion, a 25-year-old woman is not "fer-
tile" if she is using a highly effective method of birth control (e.g., oral contraceptives), how-
ever, she is still of childbearing capacity.
2. Reproductive injuries in men and women refer to those injuries that damage the re-
productive systems. In addition, both the courts and commentators have often categorized fetal
injury, due to the mother's work-related exposure, as a type of reproductive injury. Workplace
hazards that cause reproductive injury will hereinafter be referred to as "reproductive
hazards." See infra text accompanying notes 70-75.
3. See, e.g., Manson, Human and Laboratory Test Systems Available for Detection of
Reproductive Failure, 7 PREVENTIVE MED. 322, 327 (1978) (lead exposure in men resulted
in reproductive failure and decreased sperm count). Although there are many compounds that
may cause reproductive injury to males or their offspring, the focus of this comment will be on
reproductive injury to females or their offspring.
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from injuries to the mother or the fetus 4 caused by hazards in the
workplace.'
This comment discusses gender specific regulations that may
expose an employer to liability in a sex discrimination lawsuit. Cor-
porate Guidelines are presented which may assist the employer in
,the formulation of a valid policy to avoid such liability. Recently,
several courts ruled on the validity of policies which were allegedly
discriminatory. For example, both the Fourth' and Eleventh Circuit
7
Federal District Courts have ruled that the implementation of a pol-
icy that restricts or forbids women, but not men, from working in
areas that expose both sexes to reproductive hazards, discriminates
against women. Such a policy violates Title VII,8 as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, ' unless the employer shows that the
policy is valid through one of two defenses.10 Additionally, the eM
4. See Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 1973)
(action for prenatal injury allowed if child is born alive); Robertson, Toward Rational Bound-
aries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries
and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1401-03 (discussing wrongful life cases and the
difficulty in proving causation). See also Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus:
The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII,
69 GEo L.J. 641, 645 (1981) (employer could be held liable to women worker's children who
suffer prenatal harm for a worksite exposure under tort and contract principles of law). It
should be noted that it is much more difficult to trace fetal injuries to the male worker than to
the female worker. See Hricko, supra note I, at 399 (the causal link between a male worker's
lead exposure and his wife's miscarriage or inability to conceive is more remote and less likely
to result in a lawsuit).
5. Zener, Women in the Workplace: Toxic Substances and Sex Discrimination, 1
Toxic SUB. J. 226 (1979).
6. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). Olin's "female employment
and fetal vulnerability" program created three job classifications: 1) "restricted jobs" are those
which "may require contact with and exposure to known or suspected abortifacient or terato-
genie agents"; fertile women age 5-63 were excluded from restricted jobs; 2) "controlled jobs"
are those that may require "very limited contact with the harmful chemicals"; pregnant
women were evaluated on a case-by-case basis; and 3) "unrestricted jobs" are those that do not
present a hazard to the pregnant woman or the fetus. Id. at 1182.
7. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984). Hayes involved
an employment discrimination action against the employer hospital for violating the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act when the hospital fired an x-ray technician upon learning of her
pregnancy.
8. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). See infra note 19 for the text of section
2000e of the Civil Rights Act.
9. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964), as amended by Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978). See infra note 25 for the text of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act.
10. A cause of action based on Title VII sex discrimination should be distinguished from
a cause of action that invokes the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In the
latter case, state or governmental involvement must be present in order to bring a cause of
action. United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). No
such requirement exists with respect to a Title VII action. Additionally, because two distinct
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ployer must demonstrate through valid scientific evidence that repro-
ductive hazards affect women, not men."
In order to comply with the tests set forth by the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits, it is necessary to review several current develop-
ments in the area of health and safety. This comment explores the
effect of the Occupational Safety and Health Act Hazard Communi-
cation Standard ("OSHA Standard") enacted in 1983,1' which
required employers to establish comprehensive hazard communica-
tion programs and appropriate training for employees by May
1986.1' The OSHA Standard imposes greater responsibility on the
employer to assess potential workplace chemical hazards and to edu-
cate workers regarding these hazards. This will heighten employee
awareness concerning hazards in the workplace.
An important issue raised in both the case law and OSHA
Standard is whether there must be valid scientific evidence to docu-
ment differential reproductive effects in male and female employees
before females may be treated differently. For example, relevant sci-
entific evidence indicates that some reproductive hazards affect males
and females similarly. 4 On the other hand, some reproductive
hazards may affect the offspring of either women (e.g.,
abortifacients) 15 or men." Scientific evidence plays an extremely im-
portant role in case law and will be used to assist the employer in
assessing hazards in the workplace.
Several courts have set forth tests that would allow an employer
causes of action are involved, a plaintiff must plead causes of action based on Title VII and the
fourteenth amendment separately. Indeed, a remedy for employment discrimination under the
fourteenth amendment is not considered by the courts unless the plaintiff asserts a claim on
grounds different from those underlying a Title VII claim. See Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls,
665 F.2d 531, 534 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982).
11. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
12. Occupational Safety & Health Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1200 (1983) thereinafter OSHA Standard]. See infra note 68 for the text of the OSHA
Standard.
13. OSHA Standard, supra note 12.
14. Haas & Schottenfeld, Risks to the Offspring from Parental Occupational Expo-
sures, 2 J. Octc. MED. 607, 609 (1979) (chromosomal abnormalities occur following vinyl
chloride exposure); id. at 610-11 (benzene may cause chromosomal aberrations following
heavy occupational exposure).
15. See, e.g., Ashford & Caldart, The Control of Reproductive Hazards in the Work-
place: A Prescription for Prevention, 5 INDus. REL. L.J. 523, 527 (1983) (increased risk of
involuntary abortion or stillbirth from maternal exposure to lead); Hricko, supra note 1, at
402 (women workers suffer significantly more miscarriages from waste anesthetic gas).
16. See Manson, supra note 3, at 327 (occupational exposures of lead and
dibromochloropropane (DBCP) associated with reproductive failure, decreased sperm count,
and sperm abnormalities); Ashford & Caldart, supra note 15, at 528 (exposure to DBCP, lead
and ethylene dibromide reduce fertility in men).
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to defend an otherwise discriminatory policy. No employer, however,
has successfully defended such a policy. 17 This comment will propose
Corporate Guidelines that integrate the principles set forth in the
OSHA Standard and case law. The Guidelines are legally significant
because they provide a novel approach to identify, document, and
evaluate reproductive hazards in the workplace, as required by the
courts, prior to developing a policy that treats women differently
from men. The purpose of the Guidelines is to help avoid inappro-
priate gender discrimination and to protect the health and safety of
employees and their unborn children by gathering information and
implementing a written policy concerning reproductive hazards.
Compliance with the Guidelines can substantially reduce an em-
ployer's risk of tort liability relating to injuries to the unborn fetus
because the employer's decision would be based on a uniform policy
setting forth appropriate standards. In addition, the Guidelines could
be used to support either a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOQ) or a Business Necessity defense in a Title VII sex discrimi-
nation lawsuit.' 8
II. HISTORY OF GENDER SPECIFIC REGULATIONS
A. Title VII, Civil Rights Act (1964)
The foundation for a sex discrimination lawsuit was established
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national origin or
sex.19 Title VII was later amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act to include protection against discrimination of pregnant women.
Historically, some employers, legislators and courts have restricted
17. See Wright, 697 F.2d at 1172; Zuniga v. Kleburg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th
Cir. 1982); Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1543.
18. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text for a discussion concerning the BFOQ
and Business Necessity defenses.
19. The 1964 Civil Rights Act states, in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. . ..
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
[Vol. 27
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the employment opportunities of women professing concern for the
health of women and their offspring.20 In 1908, the United States
Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon" upheld a statute prohibiting
females from working more than ten hours per day in a mechanical
establishment, factory or laundry because it was "dangerous to the
public health, safety, morals or welfare."12  Sixty-eight years later in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert"5 the Supreme Court held that Con-
gress did not include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy within
the protection of Title VII's definition of gender-based discrimina-
tion. However, Gilbert was in effect overruled when Congress passed
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 24
B. Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
In 1978, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was amended
by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[wiomen affected by
pregnancy and related conditions must be treated the same as other
applicants and employees on the basis of their ability or inability to
work."'25 A policy that discriminates against women based upon their
ability to become pregnant puts them in a category that is afforded
protection under Title VII in a sex discrimination lawsuit. A woman
could argue that such a policy is either facially discriminatory or that
it has a disparate impact on a group protected under Title VII.26
20. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1543.
21. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
22. Id. at 416. But see Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971)(employment policy denying opportunities on the basis of characterization of physical capabili-
ties and endurance of women not excusable under the exceptions in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act).
23. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
24. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964), as amended by Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978).
25. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act states, in pertinent part:
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, in-
cluding receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section
2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. . ..
Id.
26. An employer's defense to a facial discrimination lawsuit is referred to as a Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying
text. An employer's defense to a disparate impact argument is referred to as a Business Neces-
sity defense. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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1. Title VII Sex Discrimination Lawsuit
a. Facial Discrimination I Disparate Impact
A facially discriminatory policy, as defined in Hayes v. Shelby,
is a policy adopted by an employer that explicitly treats some em-
ployees differently from others based on race, religion, national
origin or gender (pregnancy). 27 A policy designed to protect female
employees and their potential offspring from workplace hazards is
facially discriminatory. Furthermore, a policy that only applies to
pregnant women and their offspring is facially discriminatory. Even
if the employer successfully argues that the policy is neutral, the
plaintiff may show that it has a disparate or disproportionate impact
on a group protected under Title VII.
A disparate impact argument occurs when the employer's policy
is facially neutral but the plaintiff demonstrates that it has a dispro-
portionate impact on a group protected under Title VII.2" The
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
with statistics and scientific evidence that the policy has a disparate
impact on a protected class.2 '9 In Hayes v. Shelby, the court said that
an employer must prove that a policy applied to women or pregnant
women employees, "is justified on a scientific basis and is not neces-
sary to protect the offspring of male employees. ... s0 Such a
policy would be "neutral" in the sense that it protects the offspring
of all employees; however, it would have a disproportionate impact
on a group protected under Title VII, i.e., pregnant women."1 Two
defenses may be used against an allegation that a policy is facially
27. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547.
28. Id. A plaintiff who uses a disparate impact argument may prevail without proving
intentional discrimination as would be required under an equal protection analysis under the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985)
(black woman, who alleged she had been discriminated against by employer, filed one cause of
action under Title VII and the other under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
29. Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 986. In this case a hospital violated Title VII by terminating a
pregnant x-ray technician on the basis of fetal harm and resultant liability. The plaintiff origi-
nally filed suit against the hospital alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. On appeal, Zuniga argued that she
had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination. First, she argued that sex discrimina-
tion was present because the hospital's facially neutral policy of terminating pregnant x-ray
technicians burdened women's employment opportunities without affecting those of men. Sec-
ond, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding that the hospital had a valid
Business Necessity defense to her prima facie case. See also Logan, Adapting Fetal Vulnera-
bility Programs to Title VII: Wright v. Olin, 9 EMPL. REL. L.J. 605 (1984).
30. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552.
31. Id.
[Vol. 27
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discriminatory or that it has a disparate impact on a particular
group.
b. Defenses
The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense is
an affirmative defense to facial discrimination and requires that the
employer demonstrate that the discriminatory policy was reasonably
necessary both to the "essence of its business" and to the "promotion
of worker safety or efficiency.""2 An employer may rebut an em-
ployee's prima facie case of an overtly intended discriminatory act by
articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the policy.
The effect of the nondiscriminatory reason is to make an otherwise
facially discriminatory policy "neutral.""3
The BFOQ defense has only been available when the employer
has shown that the excluded class was unable to perform the duties
that constitute the essence of the job.3 ' In Hayes v. Shelby, the court
held that there is no defense to a facially discriminatory policy unless
the employer shows a direct relationship between the policy and the
actual ability of a pregnant or fertile female to perform her job." To
prevail, the employer must produce scientific evidence, from experts
in the relevant fields, of reproductive effects relating to the specific
compound or exposure. 6 Additionally, if employers prove that there
is a significant risk of harm, they must then show through scientific
32. Ashford & Caldart, supra note 15, at 544-45.
33. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See Wright,
697 F.2d at 1183 (claimants argued that their fetal protection program served a legitimate
nondiscriminatory purpose that could be used as evidence to rebut any prima facie case of sex
discrimination). But see Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547-48 (court reasoned that because the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act mandates that a pregnancy-based rule can never be neutral, Bur-
dine is inapplicable).
34. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1549.
35. Id.
36. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182, 1190. In this case, three employees testified as to the
necessity of the policy in question. The first witness, the corporate director of Health Affairs
and a medical doctor, testified that the policy was necessary to protect the unborn fetuses of
pregnant women from the damaging toxic effects of certain chemicals. However, he was una-
ble to name the articles or journals which supported his medical conclusions. The second
witness testified that he had measured the exposure levels of certain chemicals and had rejected
alternatives, such as substituting non-toxic materials or improving ventilation or personal pro-
tective equipment as being infeasible. Finally, the third witness testified that he had not been
consulted during the program's development and was not familiar with any research done
before its implementation. The court concluded that none of the witnesses were qualified or
testified as experts in any relevant scientific or medical field.
In Hayes, the court found that although any amount of radiation can have a detrimental
effect on humans, it is extremely unlikely that radiation below certain levels will have a detri-
mental effect on a particular individual. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1550.
1987]
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evidence that the hazard does not also apply to male employees or
their offspring."7
A Business Necessity defense is an affirmative defense to a dis-
parate impact claim.88 The Business Necessity defense may be used
by an employer in two situations. The first instance is when there is
substantial risk of harm to the fetus or potential offspring of women
employees from exposure, either during pregnancy or while fertile,
to toxic hazards in the workplace. The second instance is when the
hazard applies to fertile or pregnant women, but not to men.
9 The
test is whether there exists an "overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business."4 ° To reach the disparate impact stage of
analysis, the employer must overcome the presumption of facial dis-
crimination by demonstrating "that its policy is justified on a scien-
tific basis and addresses a harm that does not affect men."
'4 1 The
burden of persuasion is on the employer to present evidence of
significant risks of reproductive injury to women workers or their
unborn children arising from exposure to toxic hazards in the work-
place, requiring women, not men, to be restricted.' Additionally,
employers must show that there are no acceptable alternatives that
would accomplish the purpose with a less adverse impact on one
sex 48 and that the programs of restriction are effective for the in-
tended purpose." The Corporate Guidelines discussed in section VI
37. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548 (citing Williams, supra note 4, at 661). Williams argues
that an employer may be able to restrict women in those instances where scientific evidence
indicates women are exposed to reproductive risks, but no such evidence exists concerning men.
38. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The cases thus far have only
applied the Business Necessity defense to a disparate impact claim. However, it may be possi-
ble to apply the Business Necessity defense to a facial discrimination assertion.
39. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190-91; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548 n.8. Hayes borrowed the
requirements from Wright's Business Necessity defense. Although Hayes does not specifically
adopt the term "Business Necessity," the requirements are identical to Wright.
40. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1188 (citing Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798
(4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)).
41. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1553.
42. See Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798 (necessity and effectiveness criteria stated); Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (objective basis rather than subjective assumptions
required to establish BFOQ defense); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 367
n.6 (4th Cir. 1980) (objective proof required to establish a business necessity).
43. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1191; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1553.
44. Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992. See also Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798; Wright, 697 F.2d at
1191; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1553. But see Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474
(E.D. Va. 1978) (Business Necessity defense upheld in airline case when safety of passenger,
not pregnant female, was considered); Levin v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1984) (removal of pregnant woman as soon as pregnancy was discovered was justified by Busi-
ness Necessity defense).
[Vol. 27
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below are designed to support either a BFOQ or Business Necessity
defense.
2. Fetal Protection Policies Under Title VII
Two recent cases, Wright v. Olin45 and Hayes v. Shelby46 held
that the Business Necessity defense was more appropriate than theBFOQ defense in considering fetal protection programs under Title
VII. However, the methods used to reach these decisions were differ-
ent.'7 Fetal protection policies generally concern fertile women or
women of childbearing capacity, ranging in age from 16-50.48 In
Wright v. Olin the term "childbearing capacity" included women
ranging in age from 5-63. 41 These policies may involve either facial
discrimination (e.g., fertile or pregnant females are treated
differently because they are pregnant, not because of their work per-
formance) or disparate impact (e.g., although the policy may befacially neutral, the effect of the policy is that it has a disproportion-
ate impact on a particular group). 50
Fetal protection policies have often been criticized because theprograms operate to exclude women while allowing men to continue
in jobs that expose them to similar reproductive risks.51 One author
argues that there is scientific evidence supporting the theory that
such programs are under-inclusive in that they do not include men
exposed to hazardous substances.52 Others have argued that, while
fetal protection policies may provide some protection for future off-
spring, the economic benefit inures largely to the employer who
45. 697 F.2d at 1185-86 n.21.
46. 726 F.2d at 1549.
47. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189. The court did not believe that the fetus was directlyprotected by the Business Necessity defense. Instead, the court specially categorized the fetus as
an invitee and licensee on the business premises, and protected the fetus via its special categori-
zation if exposed to any of the associated workplace hazards. But see Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552
n.14, where the court explicitly rejected the special categorization of the fetus stating insteadthat "fetal protection is a legitimate area of employer concern to which the Business Necessity
defense extends."
48. Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H. CAS. (BNA) 1596, 1597(1981). The American Cyanamid policy excluded women aged 16 through 50 from productionjobs in the lead pigment department unless they could prove that they had been surgically
sterilized. The purpose of the policy was to protect the fetuses of women workers from expo-
sure to lead. Id.
49. 697 F.2d at 1182. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
51. See Logan, supra note 29, at 608 (discussion concerning the exclusion of female
employees based on fetal health when exposure in the workplace due to toxic substances occurs
with male and female workers).
52. Id. at 607-08.
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avoids the cost of removing the reproductive hazard from the work-
place.5" Fetal protection programs generally fall into two categories:
1) policies that prohibit all women of childbearing capacity from
working with reproductive hazards in the workplace; and 2) policies
that prohibit other specifically defined groups from working with re-
productive hazards.
a. Policies that Prohibit Women of Childbearing Capac-
ity from Working with Reproductive Hazards
A policy that prohibits all women of childbearing capacity from
working with reproductive hazards may be too broad because it "dis-
criminates against women on the basis of their potential to become
pregnant. '5 4 For example, American Cyanamid, a chemical com-
pany, established a policy in 1977 which required that women of
childbearing age (16-50) be removed from production jobs in the
lead pigment department unless they could prove they had been ster-
ilized. The policy was overbroad because it categorically restricted
all women of childbearing capacity regardless of whether the women
wanted or were capable of having children, or whether the women
or their spouses used contraceptives. Ironically, this policy was also
criticized for being under-inclusive because men suffered reproduc-
tive injury from lead exposure, yet no such policy applied to men.55
In addition to these criticisms of fetal protection policies, some poli-
cies are ineffective because they do not accomplish their intended
purpose.
A policy that does not take effect until after a woman has
knowledge that she is pregnant may be ineffective in preventing fetal
injury during the first several weeks of pregnancy.56 For example,
certain exposures, including lead and radiation, are known to cause
significant damage to the fetus during the first six weeks of develop-
ment.5 7 In Hayes v. Shelby, significant damage to a fetus due to a
53. Ashford & Caldart, supra note 15, at 534.
54. Id. at 544. See also Hricko, supra note 1, at 400 (as many as 100,000 females may
be affected by fetal protection policies).
55. American Cyanamid, 9 O.S.H. CAs. (BNA) at 1597, 1605. See also supra note 48.
In contrast, A T & T Technology Systems recently offered to transfer pregnant female produc-
tion workers to jobs of equal pay after a study indicated an increase in miscarriages among
such workers. San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 13, 1987, at 8a.
56. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1551 n.13; Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 986.
57. Ashford & Caldart, supra note 15, at 527 (increased risk of involuntary abortion
from maternal exposure to lead during first six weeks after conception); Zuniga, 692 F.2d at
986 (damage to fetus due to radiation exposure occurs during first six weeks). See supra notes
14-16.
[Vol. 27
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technician's exposure occurred during the first six weeks of preg-
nancy, prior to the woman's knowledge of her pregnancy,.68 When
the purpose of the policy is to prevent fetal injury, and the policy is
found to be ineffective for that purpose, an employee cannot be ter-
minated. Thus, in Hayes v. Shelby, the court found that the policy
was ineffective and ruled that it was a pretext for discrimination.59
That does not indicate that there are no instances where fetal protec-
tion policies are valid.
b. Policies that Prohibit Specifically Defined Groups
from Working with Reproductive Hazards
As discussed above, fetal protection policies that discriminate
against all women of childbearing capacity violate Title VII, as
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, unless the employer
successfully applies either the BFOQ or Business Necessity de-
fense. 60 The employer should narrowly define the group that he or
she determines must be protected by the fetal protection policy.
Moreover, in order for a fetal protection policy to withstand a dis-
crimination lawsuit, there should be a written policy that informs the
affected employees of their rights before they become pregnant, pro-
vides warnings about the potential danger of the employment, and
demonstrates that the employer has attempted a balance between
employee safety and equal employment opportunities." Finally, any
policy that excludes certain women must be based on sound medical
data that supports the theory that the reproductive risks only affect
the excluded females.62 These principles comprise the backbone of
the proposed Guidelines described in section VI.
An evaluation of reproductive hazards should take into account
the health and safety of all employees. The "exclusion of one seg-
58. 726 F.2d at 1551 n.13; see infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text concerning
injury to the fetus due to worker exposure to reproductive hazards.
59. 726 F.2d at 1551 n.13. See Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 986. In Zuniga, the hospital had an
unwritten policy requiring that pregnant x-ray technicians be fired or terminated without any
guarantee of reinstatement as soon as they discovered that they were pregnant. The hospital's
policy was found ineffective for the intended purpose of protecting the fetus because the dam-
age would have been done before the woman found out she was pregnant. In addition, the
court ruled that the policy was unconstitutional because the hospital failed to utilize an alter-
nate, less discriminatory means of achieving its end (e.g., alternative employment, leave of
absence). The hospital's business purpose was a pretext, and its Business Necessity defense
failed. Id. at 992-93.
60. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
61. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1549 n.10. See also Lake, Liability and Societal Obligation are
Bases for Fetal Protection Laws, 8 Bus. HEALTH 49 (July/Aug. 1984).
62. Zener, supra note 5, at 234. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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ment of the working force, in the interest of 'safety,' may act to di-
vert public attention from the harder question - the limits to which
a society can afford to subject its workers to high levels of risk and
injury."68 In considering the risks and injuries due to worker expo-
sures to reproductive hazards, it is important to discuss the legislative
authority that regulates safe and healthful working conditions.
C. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)
The Occupational Safety and Health Act was enacted in 1970
to assure, so far as possible, every man and woman in the nation safe
and healthful working conditions by encouraging employers and em-
ployees to reduce the number of occupational safety and health
hazards and by authorizing the imposition of mandatory occupa-
tional safety and health standards." OSHA ultimately affects fetal
protection policies by requiring employers "to reduce to the maxi-
mum extent 'feasible,' employee exposure to toxic agents causing
material impairment of health."65 Although OSHA has a duty to
provide a safe and healthful workplace for employees, it is unclear
whether this duty extends to the future offspring of workers." Many
employers have assumed that they may be liable for tort damages
from injury to the unborn fetus. This assumption has led to the im-
plementation of fetal protection policies by employers who treat
women of childbearing capacity differently than men who may be
63. Comment, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L.
RFv. 1113, 1142 (1977).
64. The Declaration of Purpose and Policy of the Occupational Safety & Health Act
[hereinafter OSHA] states, in pertinent part:
(a) The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of
work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, in-
terstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and
disability compensation payments.
(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the exer-
cise of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and with for-
eign nations and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions and to preserve our human resources ...
Occupational Safety & Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 2, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 651(a), (b) (1970)).
65. Zener, supra note 5, at 227. See American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493
(5th Cir. 1978), af'd sub nom., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 610 (1980) ("[a] standard is neither 'reasonably necessary' nor 'feasible,'
as required by the Act, if it calls for expenditures wholly disproportionate to the expected
health and safety benefits.").
66. Ashford & Caldart, supra note 15, at 524 (authors argue that reproductive hazards
are a proper subject for standard setting under OSHA when the exposure poses a danger to
the health or functional capacity of the exposed workers or their offspring).
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exposed to the same reproductive risks. In 1983, OSHA promulgated
a Hazard Communication Standard67 designed to improve the health
and safety of employees.
D. OSHA Hazard Communication Standard
The OSHA Hazard Communication Standard required em-
ployers to perform the following tasks by May 1986: 1) establish a
comprehensive hazard communication program which includes as-
sessing the hazard of chemicals in the workplace, labeling and other
types of warning; 2) establish training programs that include the
methods used to detect the presence or release of a hazardous chemi-
cal in the work area (e.g., measuring airborne, exposure levels in the
work area); and 3) inform employees of the measures they can take
to protect themselves from hazards. 8 The OSHA Standard will
force employers to evaluate hazards in the workplace and properly
train employees. Employers will obtain new toxicological informa-
tion that may better prepare them to design a fair policy that
67. OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1983).
68. The OSHA Standard states, in pertinent part:(h) Employee information and training. Employers shall provide employees
with information and training on hazardous chemicals in their work area at the
time of their initial assignment, and whenever a new hazard is introduced into
their work area.
(1) Information. Employees shall be informed of:
(i) The requirements of this section;
(ii) Any operations in their work area where hazardous chemicals are
present; and,
(iii) The location and availability of the written hazard communica-
tion program, including the required list(s) of hazardous chemicals, and mate-
rial safety data sheets required by this section.
(2) Training. Employee training shall include at least:
(i) Methods and observations that may be used to detect the presence
or release of a hazardous chemical in the work area (such as monitoring con-
ducted by the employer, continuous monitoring devices, visual appearance or
odor of hazardous chemicals when being released, etc.);
(ii) The physical and health hazards of the chemicals in the work
area;
(iii) The measures employees can take to protect themselves from
these health hazards, including specific procedures the employer has imple-
mented to protect employees from exposure to hazardous chemicals, such as ap-
propriate work practices, emergency procedures, and personal protective equip-
ment to be used; and,
(iv) The details of the hazard communication program developed by
the employer, including an explanation of the labeling system and the material
safety data sheet, and how employees can obtain and use the appropriate hazard
information. . ..
Id. at § 1910.1200(h).
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protects all workers' health and safety rather than protect select
groups. In order to comply with the OSHA Standard, employers
should review scientific data to evaluate the workplace. The OSHA
Standard will be used as a tool for gathering information to evaluate
the scientific and other data necessary to make informed decisions
concerning reproductive hazards.
III. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE RELATING TO REPRODUCTIVE
EXPOSURES
To defend an otherwise discriminatory policy, an employer
must establish through scientific experts that exposure to certain
substances has reproductive effects on the selected group (e.g., preg-
nant women). 9 This requires an understanding of reproductive
hazards.
A. Reproductive Hazard Defined
A reproductive hazard is any hazard where a work-related ex-
posure is capable of either harming the fetus of the exposed worker
or harming the reproductive system or sexual capacity of the exposed
worker.70 Toxic substances that may cause reproductive damage are
generally divided into two categories: mutagens and teratogens. A
mutagen is a chemical which damages genetic materials. If the ge-
netic material is in the egg or sperm, the damage may be passed on
to future generations. If the genetic material is not in the egg or
sperm, the damage may only persist in that person for his or her
lifespan. Removal from exposure to the mutagen in the workplace
does not remove the damage, but prevents additional harm.
7 1 A ter-
atogen, on the other hand, is a chemical which produces damage to
the fetus after conception. 1 The most crucial period of development
during which a fetus is susceptible to damage is during the first three
to eight weeks after conception. However, most women are between
four to six weeks pregnant before they know they have conceived."'
At later stages of development, growth retardation and functional
disturbances are the most common injuries resulting from toxic expo-
69. Logan, supra note 29, at 606-07.
70. Ashford & Caldart, supra note 15, at 524.
71. Logan, supra note 29, at 606.
72. Id. at 607. See also McElveen, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace, 20 FORUM
547, 548-51 (1985).
73. Carr & Gedeon, Population Cytogenetics of Human Abortuses, POPULATION CY-
TOC.NE'TICs 1-9 (E.B. Hook & I.H. Porter eds. 1977); Manson, supra note 3, at 325; Logan,
supra note 29, at 607.
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sure. 4 Before developing a fetal protection policy, employers must
evaluate occupational risks to determine the nature of the exposure
and the type of injury the worker or fetus would suffer.7 5
B. Occupational Exposures
An occupational exposure is an exposure to a hazard on the job
that may or may not affect the reproductive system of the worker.
Occupational exposures may affect workers' offspring in two ways:
1) the chemical substance crosses the placenta and damages the em-
bryo or fetus (sometimes resulting in spontaneous abortion); or 2)
exposure to the male or female is transferred genetically during
fertilization.78 Scientific evidence exists concerning the reproductive
affects of specific industrial agents in both males and females.
Based on sound scientific evidence, restricting women of
childbearing capacity from work-related exposures may not ade-
quately protect the fetus from reproductive hazards since both fertile
males and females are susceptible to reproductive damage.78 It has
been suggested that the most reasonable approach to reduce repro-
ductive hazards is to lower or abolish the exposure levels of all
workers to potentially toxic substances thus making the workplace a
safer environment.7 Unfortunately, reducing or eliminating expo-
sure levels may not be economically or technically feasible. In any
event, the employer has the responsibility to evaluate reproductive
74. Manson, supra note 3, at 325.
75. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
76. Zener, supra note 5, at 226.
77. Ashford & Caldart, supra note 15, at 527 (increased risk of involuntary abortion
from maternal exposure to lead); Manson, supra note 3, at 327 (occupational exposures to
lead associated with reproductive failure in men as well as decreased sperm count); Strobino,
Kline & Stein, Chemical and Physical Exposures of Parents: Effects on Human Offspring, 1
EARL. HUMAN DEV. 371, 372, 390 (1978) (anesthetic gas exposure in workers associated
with reproductive failure in males; paternal exposure to vinyl chloride is associated to sponta-
neous abortion in the wives of exposed men); Hricko, supra note 1, at 402 (occupational
exposure to anesthetic gas associated with reproductive failure in males); Haas & Schottenfeld,
supra note 14, at 609-11 (heavy occupational exposure to anesthetic gas may cause chromo-
somal aberrations and may persist for years; benzene exposure may cause reproductive injury;
chromosomal abnormalities may occur especially following intense exposures of vinyl chloride);
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(ethylene oxide is both mutagenic and carcinogenic in animals and humans); Manson, supra
note 3, at 322 (vinyl chloride is capable of causing reproductive failure in males and females).
78. Hricko, supra note 1, at 395 (occupational exposures harm reproductive systems of
both males and females by causing genetic, gametotoxic, intrauterine or extrauterine effects).
See also Strobino, Kline & Stein, supra note 77, at 375 (paternal exposure to vinyl chloride
associated with spontaneous abortion in wives of exposed men); Haas & Schottenfeld, supra
note 14, at 611 (congenital anomalies reported in offspring of male anesthesiologists).
79. Manson, supra note 3, at 327.
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hazards and to adopt a fair and reasonable policy that is not gender
specific, but rather protects the health and safety of all employees.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Fetal protection policies tend to treat women of childbearing ca-
pacity differently from men in jobs that may expose both sexes to
reproductive injury. The policies are adopted by employers to avoid
tort liability relating to injuries sustained by the unborn fetus due to
worker exposure. Instead, employers may be faced with a sex dis-
crimination lawsuit.8" In adopting broad fetal protection policies that
exclude all women of childbearing capacity, many employers have
ignored scientific evidence that indicates males as well as females
may suffer from reproductive injury due to exposures to a particular
chemical in the workplace.8" Recent case law as well as the OSHA
Standard have demonstrated the increased responsibility of employ-
ers concerning worker health and safety in the workplace. For
example, several courts have established tests to support a Business
Necessity defense in a Title VII action that would validate a fetal
protection policy.82 However, no employer has successfully defended
such a policy.
Corporate Guidelines are proposed below to reduce the em-
ployer's risk of liability. By using these Guidelines, the employer can
implement a valid policy which evaluates workplace hazards and in-
corporates existing tests established by the Courts. 8
V. ANALYSIS
Employers have several options to choose from in developing
policies that protect workers and their unborn children from repro-
ductive injuries. A policy that restricts or eliminates all women of
childbearing capacity from the workforce via the implementation of
gender specific regulations may be overbroad. For example, the pol-
icy may not take into consideration whether the female employee
wants children, or whether she or her spouse use contraceptives.
Employers who adopt policies without scientific evidence risk a dis-
crimination lawsuit. On the other hand, policies that take into
consideration whether the female employee wants children or uses
80. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
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contraceptives raises other problems.84 If employers do not restrict
women from working with reproductive hazards, they risk liability
in a tort action for injuries to the unborn fetus.85
At present, there are no guidelines incorporating both the infor-
mation in the OSHA Standard and the court cases. An employer
seeking to reduce his or her liability of work-related exposures has
little information with which to proceed. The solution to some of
these complicated issues is to design a policy that incorporates the
tests set forth in the court cases86 with the information collected to
comply with the OSHA Standard.8 The employer can use the
Guidelines as a legal framework to evaluate workplace hazards. In
effect, the Guidelines can be used to develop a fair policy to protect
workers from reproductive hazards. Development of such a policy
requires a thorough evaluation of the reproductive hazards in the
workplace, including a comparison of the reproductive effects in men
and women, before any groups are segregated.
A. Males and Females Suffer Similar Reproductive Injuries
If the information contained in section III, part A, subpart 4 of
the Guidelines indicates that males and females are susceptible to
reproductive injuries for a given chemical, an employer cannot en-
force a policy that treats females differently. Such a policy would
violate Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.88
A woman could argue that the policy is either facially discriminatory
or that it has a disparate impact on a group protected under Title
VII.89 An employer has no defense in this situation because under
both the BFOQ and Business Necessity defenses, the reproductive
risks must only affect the group the employer intends to restrict (e.g.,
pregnant women). 90 In this situation, the employer should attempt to
reduce the risks in the workplace for all employees.
84. These issues include: whether a woman's use of contraceptives could (or should) be
monitored; whether monitoring of a woman's choice to use contraceptives would amount to an
invasion of privacy; whether a male spouse's use of contraceptives should be monitored;
whether an employer should take into account that the male spouse uses contraceptives but the
female worker does not; and whether a birth control method need be 100% accurate before the
employer is willing to risk liability.
85. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
86. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1172; Zuniga, 692 F.2d 986; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1543.
87. See supra note 12-13 and accompanying text.
88. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964), as amended by Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978).
89. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
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B. Females, Not Males, Suffer Reproductive Injuries
An employer should be able to construct a valid policy, based on
information obtained through the application of the Guidelines to
protect female workers from reproductive hazards. In developing a
policy, an employer should determine whether the reproductive in-
jury affects all women. For example, an employer may be justified in
excluding all women of childbearing capacity from working with
compounds that cause reproductive injury to the female worker prior
to her knowledge of pregnancy. Examples of reproductive injuries
that occur during the first six weeks of fetal development include
lead and radiation exposure as well as exposure to abortifacients.
The female employee could argue that the policy is facially discrimi-
natory, or that it has a disparate impact on a group protected under
Title VII. The employer, however, would argue that: 1) there is
substantial risk of harm to the potential offspring of women employ-
ees from exposure to reproductive hazards; 2) the hazard applies to
fertile or pregnant women, but not men; and 3) the hazard cannot
reasonably or practically be reduced. 1 It should be noted that in the
recent cases involving fetal protection policies, the employers were
unable to demonstrate a valid Business Necessity defense through
scientific evidence.
9 2
The diagram and questions in section III, part A, subpart 4 of
the Guidelines provide a format for the employer to obtain scientific
information to support either a BFOQ or Business Necessity de-
fense. If the employer comes forward with evidence supporting a
BFOQ or Business Necessity defense, the employee may argue that
there are acceptable alternatives that would accomplish the same
purpose.9 Examples of alternatives include: 1) allowing only women
who use highly effective methods of contraceptives to work in areas
that pose reproductive risks; 2) transferring the women to other ar-
eas that do not expose them to reproductive risks; or 3) reducing the
reproductive risks if technically and economically feasible. If, on the
other hand, the reproductive injury would not take place until after a
woman discovered that she was pregnant, an employer could design
a policy that would only restrict a precisely defined group (i.e., preg-
nant women). Here again, a pregnant employee could argue that the
policy has a disparate impact on pregnant women, thus affording
Title VII protection. The employer could oppose a discrimination
91. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
92. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1551 n.13.
93. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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lawsuit with a Business Necessity defense supported by scientific evi-
dence. The Corporate Guidelines described below provide a legal
format for collecting relevant information needed to evaluate repro-
ductive hazards in the workplace. In turn, this information could be
used to develop a policy for handling reproductive hazards. Addition-
ally, the information could be used to support either a BFOQ or
Business Necessity defense.
VI. MODEL CORPORATE GUIDELINES
To assist employers in obtaining relevant information to address
the liability issues raised by employers as well as some discrimina-
tion and worker safety issues raised by employees, Corporate
Guidelines (Appendix A) are proposed. The purpose of the Guide-
lines is to obtain information concerning the workplace to determine:
1) whether there are reproductive hazards in the workplace; 2) who
is affected (e.g., males and females, males only, females only, unborn
children of either male or female); 3) whether the risks can be re-
duced; and 4) whether the group can be narrowed. The Guidelines
should assist the employer in complying with current case law as
well as the OSHA Standard. The information obtained through the
use of the Guidelines could be used to support either a BFOQ or
Business Necessity defense.
The questions in Appendix A are intended to assist the em-
ployer in evaluating information relating to workplace hazards. The
employer could then develop a written policy that informs employees
of their rights and warns them of hazards in the workplace. Addi-
tionally, if the employer determines that, based on the information
obtained, select groups should be treated differently, any written
policy should describe how that decision was reached. Finally, to
maximize the use of the Guidelines, scientific evidence must support
the conclusions reached by the employer.
VII. CONCLUSION
Employers have increasingly sought to enforce policies that pro-
tect workers and their unborn children from reproductive injuries.
However, a policy that restricts or eliminates all women of
childbearing capacity from the workforce by the implementation of
fetal protection policies may be overbroad. Gender specific regula-
tions are designed to protect the employer from liability from a
discrimination lawsuit, as well as to protect women of childbearing
capacity and their unborn children from reproductive injuries due to
1987]
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worker exposure. In order to develop a fair and reasonable policy
that protects the health and safety of all workers, employers must
evaluate and document reproductive hazards in the workplace before
designing a gender-based policy that excludes a segment of the
workforce. The first step in designing a policy is to gather informa-
tion and evaluate reproductive hazards.
Corporate Guidelines are proposed to assist the employer in
evaluating whether the employer is in compliance with the tests set
forth in the recent case law, as well as incorporating the information
required under the new OSHA Standard. The information obtained
through the use of the Guidelines could then be used to support ei-
ther a BFOQ or Business Necessity defense against a sex discrimi-
nation lawsuit. Additionally, the information could be used to help
the employer develop a fair and reasonable written policy concerning
the health and safety of all employees.
Sherri Evans-Stanton
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Appendix A
MODEL CORPORATE GUIDELINES
Yes No
Is the policy facially discriminatory?
A. Does the policy explicitly treat a defined
group of employees differently from others
(e.g., pregnant women)?
B. Is the group protected under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act?
II. Does the policy have a disparate impact on a
group protected under Title VII (based on race,
color, creed, national origin or sex (including
pregnancy))?
III. Are there any defenses?
A. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOQ) defense
1. Is the policy reasonably necessary both
to the essence of the business and to
the promotion of worker safety?
2. Is there a substantial risk of harm to
either the employee or unborn child
affected by the policy?
3. Does the hazard affect others not
covered by the policy?
4. Is there scientific evidence concerning
the reproductive effects in males, fe-
males and/or unborn children?
a. Review all records and files to
evaluate chemical compound.
b. Does human or animal data exist?
c. Is there any evidence of human
side effects (i.e., medical records,
complaints, symptoms)?
d. Are any of the physical effects
1987]
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unique to a particular group?
e. Is there a significant exposure risk
during normal operations or dur-
ing emergency situations (e.g., is
the substance being used in a
closed or open system)?
f. If there is a significant exposure,
can the risk reasonably be reduced
(i.e., is it technically or economi-
cally feasible)?
g. Is the compound one that requires
prolonged or chronic exposure
before injury occurs?
h. Are there procedures in the event
of a spill, upset or emergency?
i. Are employees monitored after a
spill, upset or emergency?
j. Are wastes generated? If so, is
there risk of exposure to such
wastes?
k. Do all employees have access to
material safety data sheets concern-
ing the chemical compound (if
applicable)?
1. Are employees properly trained?
How often?
m. Do employees use appropriate pro-
tective equipment?
n. Is equipment properly tested?
How often?
o. Is the work environment monitored
(i.e., air monitoring, wipe samples,
employee monitoring)?
p. Are there periodic inspections?
How often?
Have historical records been re-
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viewed to assist in evaluating the
workplace?
B. Business Necessity Defense
1. Is the policy absolutely necessary to the
continuation of the business?
2. Are there any reasonable alternatives?
3. Is the practice necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business?
4. Is there substantial risk of harm to the
employee or unborn children affected
by the policy?
5. Does the hazard affect others not
covered by the policy?
6. Is the program of restriction effective
for the intended purpose?
7. Is there objective scientific evidence
concerning the reproductive effects in
males, females and/or children?
1987]
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GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS
YES
Develop a narrowly-drawn
gender-specific policy and
establish documentation for
defense.
